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The way information and communication technology (ICT) develops can promote 
or hinder the democratic potential of this critical societal infrastructure. Concerns 
about the role standards development organizations (SDOs) play in this context 
predate the ‘digital age’ but are reemerging amid substantial changes in the 
institutional landscape of standardization. This article explores the increasingly 
critical link between the institutional design of SDOs and the democratic design 
of ICT. We review some principles of democracy in terms of the design of 
technology, apply these to standardization, and discuss the role public policy may 
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In 1974, a US congressional subcommittee report emphasized the need to secure 
equitable access to voluntary technical standardization.i This report warned of committee 
standardization’s tendency to structurally exclude relevant interests from participating in the 
shaping of technical standards and that the internationalization of standards development 
organizations (SDOs) threatens to further remove this activity – which is particularly important 
to network technologies – from the reach of those who would be affected by decisions made 
here. Since these issues were raised in a public policy framework thirty years ago, voluntary 
standardization has increased many times in importance especially for the elaboration of 
information and communications technology (ICT), a multipurpose network technology. The 
ICT standardization regime has undergone a comprehensive phase of proliferation and 
internationalization in step with emerging (and merging) information and communication 
technologies. The landscape of SDOs is global and fragmented, and there is no indication that it 
develops towards a unitary system even though some observers would find it attractive to cut 
back the organizational plethora (cf. Genschel 1997).  
In recent work the socio-economic importance of voluntary standardization has been 
emphasized. But at the same time concerns over the fragmentation of standardization, the 
governance of SDOs, access to them and other issues have become acute, while the role of public 
policy has become less clear (cf. Mattli (ed.) 2001). Repeatedly it is called for broader 
participation opportunities in the standardization process (Tarmarin 1988, Rankine 1995, Jakobs 
2000, Egyedi 2001) which would also improve its democratic quality. In this article, we integrate 
these discussions into the frame of the larger discussion of ‘democratic ICT’ to address the 
question of how public policy can promote the democratic design of ICT. We look at standards 
development organizations collectively as an institution and ask how the governance of 
standardization can be used to improve the democratic design of ICT. The question of 
participation – and thus representation – is one of two central aspects of democratic design of 
ICT which we will explore. The other one involves ensuring ex-post that standards improve 
compatibility with democratic principles. The focus of the paper is therefore the intersection 
between the (democratic) design of ICT and the institutional design of standardization. It is 
based on the assumption that the institutional design of standardization impacts on the design and 
architecture of network technologies. The paper will: 
1. Explore perspectives on the relationship between society and network technology and 
explicate what is meant by the ‘democratic design’ of network technologies. 
2. Focus on the design of the changing regime for standardization as a locus for 
improving the integration of democratic principles to technological development. 
3. And analyze how democratic design principles are integrated in the process of 
standardization. 
 
  Principles of democracy and the design of technology 
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It is not the first time the idea of democracy has been introduced into a discussion about 
the design and development of technology. Several times in the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s, the relationship between technology and democracy and the possibility of democratic 
control of technology were an issue with a focus on high risk technologies such as nuclear power 
plants. It was argued that these technologies have an inherent (structural) risk potential and that 
at the same time the potential damage caused by an accident or a hostile attack would require 
safety provisions which are detrimental to a democratic society. This more traditional focus has 
of course acquired new relevance after hijacked commercial airliners were used to attack the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. 
The renaissance of this discussion, however, predates September 11, 2001. It focuses on 
information and communication technology in general and the Internet in particular, asking how 
these may be relevant to upholding or strengthening the mainly operative principles of 
democratic governance. Without going into the theoretical and conceptual deliberations of what 
the term democracy encompasses in detail, it does not appear to be contentious that the term 
includes a set of principles and rules which shape individual attitudes and beliefs and directly 
influence the way people think and act. But in democratic governance systems these democratic 
principles and rules are also integrated in negotiation and decision-making procedures. This 
procedural dimension is a distinctive feature of a governance system in which power is devolved 
to all members of the system. In general, a democratic governance system requires operating 
rules which match democratic values and produce democratic outcomes.  Such principles and 
rules of democratic governance include (Vedel 1999, Catinat and Vedel 2000): 
q Openness – all interested parties can participate or are represented in collective decision-making. 
q Equality – all parties have the same rights. 
q Access – the parties have access to the information they consider relevant and to the technical means 
necessary to collect and evaluate the information. 
q Transparency – the relevant principles and rules must be clear and known by all interested parties. 
q Accountability – procedures and rules must be available to identify the responsible actors without 
infringing upon somebody’s privacy. 
q Contestability– it must be possible to challenge opinions, decisions and actions without violating freedom 
of speech principles. 
 
The principles and rules of democracy provide the criteria to evaluate the democratic 
quality of structures and procedures of organizations, socio-technical systems and nations . Over 
time, some of these principles and rules may change – facilitated and stimulated by the 
opportunities of communication and exchange in global networks such as the Internet. But 
usually these changes will affect specific norms rather than more abstract formal values and 
principles of the kind listed above (CSTB 2001, 74-169; see also Engel and Keller 2000).  
While it would be an exaggeration to regard single technical artifacts as democratic or 
undemocratic, the case may be different with more encompassing technical systems and 
infrastructures. The design and architecture of a technical system can be more or less compatible 
with the values and principles of democracyii. Unlike high risk technologies, ICT is a (systemic) 
network technology that engenders not only risk factors but also support factors for democracy 
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(Barber 2002). The technology is shaped by society, but it also shapes the society and its political 
structure (Werle 2000). It may promote or hinder, but it does not determine democracy. 
Recent technological developments have actualized and spurred the discussion about the 
democratic potential of ICT. Innovations involving networks and services have expanded the 
capabilities and reduced the cost to transmit voice and text, data and images across geography in 
real time. They have convincingly demonstrated the potential to reshape the organization of our 
society. In this light, the idea of an Information Society has especially served to invite a 
discussion of democratic principles into the realm of technology. One dimension of the metaphor 
of the Information Society is that it recognizes the underlying interrelationship between society 
and technology in which economic, social and cultural processes of change interact with 
technological changes. These changes are ambivalent and may lead to different kinds of 
information society, more or less democratic. To some degree the democratic quality depends on 
how ICT is applied. This again is contingent “on how public authorities are able to frame their 
usage” (Catinat and Vedel 2000, 84). But according to the view that “technologies are social in 
their origins as well as their effects” (Mackay 1995, 41-42), it is not only the usage frame but the 
frame within which the technology is designed that play a crucial role in shaping the democratic 
quality of technology. Compliance with democratic principles in the social processes of 
technology construction will likely be reflected in the structure of technology and its democratic 
potential to a certain degree. 
The social and political significance of ICT is notable in several ways. The most 
important peculiarity involves the scope and breadth of large ICT systems, where information 
and communication infrastructures can be regarded as permeating society in a way that is 
analogous to a nervous system. The combination of the scope, the breadth, and the degree of 
permeation of such systems underlines the importance of their democratic quality. Here, it is the 
architecture of such large technical systems rather than single technical components that is 
pivotal. The architecture includes the way technical components are integrated into the system, 
how they inter-work, and how tightly they are linked to one another. These features can be more 
or less compatible with the values and structures of democracy. The architecture is based upon 
technical standards, and in many cases these standards are developed and adopted by standards 
development organizations. Thus, standardization provides an important institutional opportunity 
to incorporate social and political values in the design process. 
A second peculiarity is linked to the network nature of ICT. A generic property of a 
network technology is the interdependence and ‘complementarity’ of the network’s components 
and the positive and negative network externalities. Individual choices of designers and users 
have effects which are not restricted to the individual itself but also affect other current or 
(subsequent) potential designers and users. Potential users, in particular, may be attracted or 
excluded by these externalities. Once put into operation the technical specifications of the 
installed base are extremely difficult to change. The technology’s basic structure determines its 
future developmental path (cf. Arthur 1989). It also shapes the expectations of potential users by 
requiring their conformance to the emerging industry standards. This may severely restrict the 
scope of choices available to those who were not involved in the early stages of designing and 
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using the technology. All choices concerning its design and use can be assessed from the point of 
view of their democratic ramifications.  
This points again to the standardization process since standard-setting plays a particularly 
crucial role in the design process for these technologies. As a consequence of the path dependent 
character of the development of network technology, standardization has moved towards the 
early stages of technological design. ICT standards do not simply endorse or rubber-stamp a 
wide-spread technological practice. They are rather adopted ex-ante in a bid to lock the 
development of a network into a predetermined pattern. Exactly this fact accounts for the 
significance of the process of standardizing ICT. 
 
  Realizing democratic potential by design 
Before we look at standards development organizations and their institutional framework, 
it is necessary to develop an understanding of what the democratic potential of a technical 
system means. We already pointed out that there is no deterministic relationship between the 
design and architecture of a technical system and its repercussion on democracy.  It cannot be 
asserted that some technical systems are intrinsically democratic and others are authoritarian as 
Mumford suggested with his distinction of these two types of technologies (Mumford 1967, 234-
242). However, more fine-grained distinctions that address the specific architectural and 
structural properties of technical systems in fact can aid in the assessment of their democratic 
potential. Winner, for instance, who emphasizes that a technical system “unavoidably” has a 
distinctive political effect, distinguishes between centralized or decentralized, egalitarian or 
inegalitarian, and repressive or liberating systems (Winner 1985, 31). He argues that solar 
energy, for example, as a disaggregated, decentralized technology, is “more compatible with a 
democratic, egalitarian society” than energy systems based on nuclear power (ibid, 32). Crucial 
to Winner is the distinction between flexible and inflexible technologies. While the design and 
architecture of flexible ones can be modified and changed during their development, there are no 
alternative designs available for inflexible technologies which would alter their political effects. 
Thus, in case of inflexible technologies, there remains only the initial choice to adopt or not to 
adopt (ibid, 36). 
In terms of information and communication technology, the Internet has moved to the 
center of concern. It embodies the network of networks that interconnects a panoply of electronic 
devices and delivers a myriad of services, as foreseen by Ithiel de Sola Pool in his treatise on the 
“Technologies of Freedom” (Pool 1983). The Internet has certainly reinforced and re-inspired 
the discussion about the relationship between design and architecture of a technical system and 
democracy. If cyberspace is to be found right here in the real world (Shapiro 1999, 31), and if the 
architecture of standardized code (software) is akin to the “constitution” of cyberspace (Lessig 
1999, 5), then it is vital to make sure that this architecture is compatible with democracy. The 
following list of practical criteria which must be met by the architecture of a technical system is 
definitely not exhaustive but it includes central requirements which apply to the Internet and 
other ICT systems as well. We suggest that the design of an ICT system is democratic if it: 
q increases rather than reduces options of its use and its further development 
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q is easy to access, easy to use and transparent (concerning transparency: “push technologies” 
such as “cookies” in the World Wide Web must be easy to detect, to block and to eliminate) 
q is decentralized rather than centralized 
q is unbundled (decomposable) rather than bundled (loosely rather than tightly coupled) 
q is open (public) rather than proprietary (to avoid user lock-in) 
q allows no usage control except for statistical and operational purposes (to optimize efficiency) 
q facilitates encryption and other means to protect privacy. 
 
Compliance with these criteria certainly does not guarantee that democracy will blossom 
nor that authoritarian control of citizens will be made impossible. Notwithstanding, a look at the 
history of the Internet and the correspondence of its technical architecture with a specific set of 
socio-technical values does suggest that architectural principles and cultural values have co-
evolved and reinforced each other (Diagram 1). Several architectural elements do appear to meet 
the criteria for democratic design and some of the values clearly do match the principles and 
rules of democracy. However, it must be conceded that the culture which prevailed at the earlier 
stages of development— in which the creators of the Internet were simultaneously its early 
users— is gradually changing. Current Internet users do not directly influence technology 
because they do not interact with the network but only use application software (cf. Castells 
2001). This, on the other hand, leaves the central architectural and cultural principles of the 
Internet unaffected. Even if some developments of the Internet are observed with concern the 
fact that the network offers “extraordinary potential for the expression of citizen rights and for 
the communication of human values” leads to the conclusion that “it does contribute to 
democratization” (Castells 2001, 164). 
 
Diagram 1: Correspondence of Internet architecture and socio-political values 
 
Elements of the technical architecture Corresponding social values 
Decentralized network structures Individualism, freedom, self-responsibility 
Minimal central coordination Mistrust towards bureaucracies and 
hierarchies 
Technical autonomy of networks, soft  
integration 
Respect for autonomy and heterogeneity 
 
Open source software, public domain 
software 
 
Creativity, cooperation, active 
participation 
 
Great variety of technical options Innovativeness 




The early development of the Internet was not coordinated through market processes. 
Different government agencies, research organizations and individual academics were involved 
in designing and standardizing the network. Pure market processes would appear to be ill-suited 
for providing for the democratic design of ICT. First, markets are not readily equipped to make 
allowances for the criteria discussed above; price signals alone do not guide the producers and 
users of technology towards democratic design; and markets only exert pressures towards 
efficiency, they cannot accommodate externalities. Second, because of the free-rider problem, 
price-market institutions generally fail to sustain socially desirable activities or to stop 
undesirable activities (Bator 1958). Consider for example ICT services and equipment designed 
to improve access for the handicapped or other underprivileged minorities. They usually lack the 
resources which would guarantee the provision of appropriate services and equipment. That 
means that in order to promote democratic design, non-market mechanisms must be activated 
and some public policy intervention in the form of regulation may be necessary. Standard setting 
via committees is one such mechanism which allows democratic design criteria to be considered 
during technological development. 
 
 Standards development organizations and the design of institutions 
The design process of ICT involves choice and social negotiations. The systemic nature 
of this technology, which is comprised of components and involves linking groups of 
components, entails that negotiations take place and that decisions are made in the face of 
network externalities. Deliberations concerning the architecture of a technical system and the 
interoperation of the components often relate to standards which specify the components’ 
interfaces (including the important system-user interface). Some decisions on standards are made 
in company labs, away from direct public influence. The emerging standards are only obligatory 
to the respective company, but they may diffuse via market processes and turn into de-facto 
standards which have never been formally adopted or endorsed by any industrial or political 
decision body. Often their emergence is not easy to trace. These standards are extremely difficult 
to change because they are incorporated in products owned and used by producers and 
consumers who want to avoid the costs of switching to another standard. Other standards are 
adopted in the more open and transparent context of standards development organizations 
(SDOs). Here committees of experts develop and decide on these technical specifications. Their 
work is governed by dedicated rules and principles which embody a significant part of the 
institutional design of the SDOs (cf. Goodin (ed.) 1996). 
The rules that govern how different SDOs work can have far-reaching consequences. 
Committee-based standardization processes give rise to important questions of governance that 
have largely been overlooked (Abbott & Snidal, 2001). In general, the question of how and under 
which institutional conditions decisions are taken in SDOs, has the scope to have consequences 
well beyond the bounds of the organization.  Mattli (2001) emphasizes that standardization has 
the ability to influence industry-wide conduct, for example by moving competition away from 
product differentiation and towards marketing and distribution, where it influences industrial 
structures and sets the performance criteria for industries. 
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But SDOs also have the scope to influence the democratic design of technical systems. 
They can open up opportunity structures for the systems’ democratic design while identifying 
and addressing risk factors that may threaten democratic quality. The technical choices made “by 
committee” impinge on other choices, including those made by agents on the market. Some 
institutional rules of SDOs differ from organization to organization while others are shared. The 
rules shape the processes of collaboration, negotiation, consensus building and decision-making 
and they can be assessed from the angle of democracy. If we assume that the compatibility of 
technical architectures with principles of democracy is contingent on the democratic quality of 
the design process, the institutional arrangement of standardization processes gains crucial 
importance. 
Proliferation of committee standardization 
The potential of SDOs to influence the democratic design of information and 
communication technology is based upon the unique position these organizations have acquired 
over time. Even though many standards have evolved in the market as de-facto standards, the 
SDOs have played a key-role in the development ICT.iii In a sense, communications and 
information technologies have to a large degree grown up and begun to converge beneath a 
forest of alphanumeric acronyms like x.400, x.25, and more recently ISO/IEC 8802.3 
CSMA/CD, GSM, RFC821, http, html etc. The bases for central information and communication 
technologies for cell-phones, fax-machines, local-area networks, transmission protocols and 
many others, have been elaborated in and recommended by an alphabetic grove of international 
and regional standards development organizations such as ETSI, ANSI, ISO, ITU-T or IEEE, or 
in the thriving undergrowth of standards consortia such as the ATM forum, OMG, IETF or W3C.  
Technological convergence and the general internationalization of markets account for 
the apparent increase in importance of SDOs at the regional and international level. The changes 
of the landscape of standardization organizations can be described in terms of several 
dimensions: 
• There is a proliferation in number and type of standardization organizations. The increasing number of 
SDOs suggests that there is more room for relevant actors to participate in meaningful ways. It also means that only 
very few actors can participate at all layers, not least because of the expense of cumulative membership fees.  
• The landscape of SDOs is characterized by an increasing degree of competition in the “market for 
published standards” (David, 1995) but also an increasing degree of coordination and cooperation between different, 
more “official” SDOs and more “informal” consortia via liaison arrangements (Werle, 2001a). 
• Differences between “official” and “informal” SDOs tend to be exaggerated (Egyedi, 2001). Often 
standards are the results of a “hybrid selection process” combining market mechanisms and committee negotiations 
(Vercoulen & van Wegberg, 1999). 
• A general trend prevailing in ICT is the shift towards anticipatory standards or early standardization where 
the standardization process resembles a product development activity. If users have access to anticipatory 
standardization they can play an active role in the process and influence the design of technology (Foray, 1995). 
• The headline-trend in committee standardization can be summarized as a move from regulation to 
coordination, from national to regional and international standardization, from intergovernmental and other official 
organizations to private consortia of standardization, from ex-post to ex-ante (early) standardization and from a 
predominantly technical to a business approach (Werle, 2001b) 
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These elements of the changing landscape of SDOs indicate that new institutional forms 
of standardization have emerged whose democratic quality should be assessed. But also 
traditional SDOs have never been systematically evaluated with regard to the respective criteria. 
Organizations and rules of standardization and their democratic quality 
The rules and procedures of committee-based standardization provide the institutional 
framework in which technical choices are arrived at by diverse sets of interests. Generally the 
decision-making process will involve a range of human actors who represent a variety of market 
but also non-market interests, including (but not limited to) regulatory, academic and military 
representatives. The actors are either individual members of the SDO or they are agents of an 
organizational member. The rules and procedures serve to shape the way diverse interests 
interact in defining technical characteristics of systems. The choices reflect the competencies, as 
well as views, concerns, and values present in the committee’s process of exchange and 
negotiation. These then have the scope to become embedded in the design of the technologies, 
potentially yielding attributes that can become locked-in by strong complementarities in ways 
that are quasi-irreversible (cf. David & Werle 2000). 
A closer look at the global landscape of standardization organizations in ICT would 
indicates that they are heterogeneous in terms of several dimensions. But we would also find 
similarity concerning crucial institutional features (Werle 2001b). 
q Participation in SDOs is within certain membership rules open to those who are “substantially interested.” 
q The work is committee-based, cooperative and consensus-oriented. It follows formalized rules and procedures. 
q Working procedures are impartial and politically independent (“due process”). 
q SDOs are non-profit organizations. 
q The adopted standards are non-mandatory and public goods. They are not always free of charge but fees are 
charged on equal terms 
 
All these features conform perfectly to the basic principles of democracy but they do not 
guarantee a democratic standardization process. Openness, for instance, does not assure that 
every interested actor in fact has access to standardization. In most SDOs, participation is not 
remunerated and it is a rather expensive undertaking to contribute time and work to preparatory 
work while incurring membership fees and travel expenses. Moreover, many standards are 
highly technical and arcane and have little impact in terms of the democratic design of a 
technical system.  
In order to tackle the issues in question more systematically we suggest distinguishing 
between input and output aspects of democratic standardization. In more general theoretical 
terms of democratic theory, the input orientation is associated with the idea of “government by 
the people” while the output orientation relates to the idea of “government for the people” 
(Scharpf 1999, 6ff). Direct participation and consensus are the central pillars on which input 
legitimacy rests. But usually they only work if local problems are addressed and all affected 
individuals have the opportunity to get involved in the decision-making process. With larger 
entities, it is often difficult to ensure adequate representation of those who cannot directly 
participate – a problem that also touches upon the democratic accountability of the decision-
makers. The consensus principle is problematic, too. It affords veto power to every individual 
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involved and therefore appears to be practicable only in win-win situations of pure coordination 
or if a single technically optimal solution of a problem is available. Otherwise majority voting 
will be the only feasible decision-rule which, however, entails problems with respect to the 
protection of minorities. 
Output legitimacy is generally derived from an institutional system’s “capacity to solve 
problems requiring collective solutions” where a common interest in arriving at such solutions 
prevails (Scharpf 1999, 13). It requires that all interests be considered in the definition of the 
collective interest and that the process be governed by norms of fairness and equity concerning 
the distribution of costs and benefits. Procedural provisions are to avoid ‘problem-overload’ by 
assuring that only a narrow range of problems be dealt with. Whenever possible the potential 
impact of choices is to be assessed. Thus, from the output perspective, what is aimed at can be 
called “good governance”— to use a term which has been coined with a view at the European 
Union’s “comitology”— and the adoption of regulations by the committee system through a 
“deliberative” process in which “technical” expertise plays an important role (Joerges, 1999). 
Concerning interest representation, the emphasis is not on proportionality but on inclusiveness. 
Institutional provisions are to provide a level playing field and to assure that the plurality of 
interests articulated by firms, interest groups, public-interest organizations and governments as 
well as private individuals be included in the deliberations. At the same time an ‘interest-
overload’ has to be avoided because it would put the viability of decision-making in jeopardy. 
 
Rules affecting input legitimacy 
Standards development organizations blend input and output criteria in their institutional 
design and in their operations. The most important official international or regional SDOs such 
as the ITU-T, the standardization branch of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) follow 
the principle of territorial representation in different ways. They adhere to the one-nation, one-
vote or a nation-based weighted voting decision rule, both of which allow in principle for 
majority voting. But at the working level— in the working groups and study groups of the SDOs 
where every participant has a (sometimes weighted) vote— consensus is aimed at. At this level, 
the work is done by experts from firms and other organizations which are direct members of the 
SDOs and not only part of national delegations. Thus, at the working level, the principle of 
national representation is complemented by the principle of ‘functional representation’. Not only 
firms but also research organizations, government agencies, consumer associations and other 
groups and organizations are involved in developing standards. In no other type of SDO is input 
legitimacy as much appreciated as in the official international and regional SDOs. But the 
significance of the question of who is involved in and who is excluded from standardization is 
low only if it is confined to the aspect of territorial representation through national delegations. If 
inclusiveness is assessed from the vantage point of interest pluralism, representation is far from 
encompassing. 
As indicated earlier, the prohibitive costs incurred by those being involved in these SDOs in 
effect act to exclude interested parties from participating in standardization. Thus, severe 
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deficiencies are engrained in the established official SDOs themselves already at this basic level. 
Taschner (1999) indicate that there are three factors that tend to undermine balanced 
participation even where it is otherwise (morally) encouraged. These factors are the scarcity of 
financial resources to subsidize the participation of public interest groups, the danger that 
economic interests can stifle the voice of such groups, and voting rules that allow this voice to be 
circumvented (Taschner 1999, 1-2). Such factors pose barriers to the objective of providing for 
the participation by all social groups representing different interests and values in the 
standardization process. As such, these standards development organizations fall short of 
providing democratic (input) legitimacy at the interface of society and technology.  
But also the informal standardization organizations have problems here. To most 
consortia, the question of territorial representation is virtually irrelevant. Even organizations such 
as the European Computer Manufacturers Association (ECMA) which initially restricted 
membership to firms engaged in Europe – in order to strengthen the firms’ competitive edge and 
not to increase its own legitimacy – was opened to global players and non-European firms after a 
short period of time. Now the consortium calls itself the International Europe-Based Association 
for Standardizing Information and Communication Systems (Werle 2001a). While territorial 
representation is irrelevant to informal SDOs the consensus principle is a ubiquitous feature of 
committee standardization shared by official SDOs and consortia. Even though consensus is not 
the same as unanimity and practices have evolved to arrive at consensus in many official and 
informal SDOs, a tension between legitimacy and efficiency —if not a trade-off—in terms of 
adopting many standards quickly is undisputable (Hawkins, 1995a; Rada 2000).v The problem 
becomes more aggravated the more diverse the interests involved in a standards committee are. 
This is one reason why several consortia target industrial parties but hesitate to involve other 
stakeholders and participants as they might increase diversity. But also in this respect the 
difference between official and informal SDOs is one of degree rather than of principle (cf. 
Egyedi, 2001). 
Rules affecting output legitimacy 
The issue of inclusiveness of SDOs concerns the pluralism and diversity of interests that 
are involved in standards committees, and it relates to input as well as to output aspects of 
legitimacy. While the input view stresses that these interests be proportionally included to their 
relative weight in the population of a given territory, the output perspective places more weight 
on facilitating access to SDOs and on involving as many diverse interests as necessary to assure 
that the public interest is appropriately considered and a democratic design of technology 
emerges. What counts at the end of the day is that the design of a technical system provides for 
compatibility with established principles of democracy no matter how the details of the design 
process are shaped.  
It has been argued that the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is the most open and 
inclusive SDO in this respect (Froomkin 2003). Internet standardization has established itself 
completely detached from the official and informal SDOs. Standards are developed in one of 
numerous working groups of the IETF. These groups can be easily created, and many are wound 
up after they have finished their task. Participation in the working groups is open to anyone and a 
broad and unrestricted discussion of proposals via electronic mailing lists is possible. Only 
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individuals (and not firms or other organizations) can be members of the IETF and all the work 
is done by volunteers. But the expectation that these features attract individuals with all kinds of 
interests and concerns to participate in standardizations is obviously misleading. Users, for 
example, “are as under-represented on the distribution lists and at the meetings [of the IETF] as 
they are on ITU-T and OSI committees” (Jakobs 2000, 157). “By and large, vendors, service 
providers, and to a lesser extent, academia dominate the lists and the meetings” (ibid).  
This result is surprising but it only mirrors more recent developments. Originally the 
process of Internet development was open to many engineers, computer scientists and other 
academics. In a sense this group of pioneers was an exclusive circle, but they were at the same 
time developers and users of the network. Participation was not restricted to standard-setting 
which could not clearly be separated from other activities of network building. This was an ideal 
situation to produce democratic output, i.e. a technical structure which matches and reinforces 
the cultural and political values of a societal group which was committed to the principles of 
pluralism, participation and transparency (cf. David and Werle 2000; also CSTB 2001, 23-45).  
The user of the grown-up, technically sophisticated Internet and other mature information 
and communication technology, can be more adequately designated as a consumer who lacks the 
technical expertise to come up with meaningful concepts and specifications which express his or 
her needs and preferences. But this does not mean that lay consumers do not have needs and 
preferences or that they do not deserve to be considered in the process of technical development. 
Rather, the question is how these consumers and other lay groups and/or their needs and 
preferences can be substantially involved in standardization as a relatively transparent stage in 
the development of a technical system. 
Towards output legitimacy? 
The distinction between input and output legitimacy is helpful in assessing current 
changes of the landscape of standardization organizations. For instance, emphasizing input- 
legitimacy along the lines sketched above would entail participation requirements which are 
unsuitable to the growing number of informal organizations, especially those established at the 
international or the regional level. Even though these organizations are open to government 
officials, they do not grant them privileged status, and the officials do not claim to be 
representatives of a certain country or territory. As long as the standards being adopted by 
informal or official SDOs are voluntary and not promulgated as regulations, input legitimacy is 
of minor importance. But voluntary standards also entail “public interest” aspects, and 
occasionally voluntary standardization intersects with regulatory processes. Moreover, the fact 
that in network industries such as ICT standards tend to lock-in and then exert a soft 
implementation pressure on those who would prefer another standard indicates a need to be 
legitimated as well (cf. Hawkins 1999).  
Early on, SDOs were aware of these problems and they have been trying to cope with 
them by strengthening output legitimacy. Their initial response was to stimulate user 
participation. But the users involved were big companies from industries such as media, finance, 
aerospace or defense, and only later efforts were extended to promote broader consumer 
involvement in standardization. Since the early 1990s consumers have been represented in the 
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majority of larger informal and practically in all official SDOs in the industrialized world 
(Schepel and Falke 2000, 101ff). In many countries consumer representation is financially 
supported by governments, usually at the national level. Whether or not consumer participation 
at this level has an effect on international standardization depends on the role national 
standardization organizations can play in the international context.ii In Europe, where the 
European Commission has traditionally been involved in mandating standards and shaping the 
institutional landscape of standardization (Werle and Fuchs 1993), steps have more recently been 
made to approach the question from another angle, for example by contributing funding to the 
European Association for the Co-ordination of Consumer Representation in Standardisation 
(ANEC). ANEC is based on a network of more than 200 consumer representatives across 
Europe, and it points to the aspect of legitimacy involved. It claims that “proper consumer 
participation at all levels is vital for the credibility of the system” but ANEC stresses at the same 
time that “the lack of resources [is] the main obstacle to stronger consumer participation in 
standardization.”iii Promotion of consumer participation in standardization is based on the 
assumption that recognizing consumer requirements improves the quality of standards. The 
requirements are to be brought to bear by experts from different areas of technological expertise. 
If successful, consumer participation works to promote standards that are good from the 
consumer perspective, and this provides output legitimacy. 
The basic rationale for consumer participation can be generalized: the social utility of 
technical systems can be maximized by involving all concerned parties (stakeholders) and taking 
into account as many interests as possible at an early stage of the design process. The stakeholder 
approach which is instrumental in providing output legitimacy is processed in different variants 
in terms of the involvement of various groups of stakeholders and the directness of their 
participation. But we also find other approaches to ensure that non-industry or public policy and 
democracy interests are considered in standardization. 
 
Addressing democratic design via output legitimacy of ICT standardization 
One key aspect of using the standardization process to address the democratic design of 
ICT systems then concerns the effective integration of a greater plurality of interests into the 
standardization process. A sufficiently broad representation of interests is generally seen as in the 
best interest of the standardization process, even if it comes at the cost of the process taking 
longer. Broader involvement among vendor and user groups can help insure that the output 
reflects the needs and preferences of the market. The involvement of these groups is linked to the 
efficiency of the standardization process. It is obviously inefficient to arrive at a standard 
technology nobody wants, no matter how quickly it was arrived at. But from the point of view of 
designing technology which is compatible with the principles of democracy, participation cannot 
be restricted to producer and consumer involvement. Broadening the basis of output legitimacy 
requires the participation of other stakeholders representing non-market interests such as trade 
unions and environmental groups. 
Limits of the stakeholder approach 
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In Europe in particular, trade unions participate in some areas of standardization. They 
mainly focus on health and safety standards which are often mandated by the European 
Commission and have the character of binding regulations rather than voluntary standards. In 
1989, the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) set up a Technical Bureau for Health 
and Safety (TUTB) which became an associated member of the European Committee for 
Standardization (CEN) in 1993.iiii Similar developments can be observed at the national level. In 
Germany, for instance, the Trade Union Federation (DGB) called for a “democratic” process of 
standards development as early as 1975. “Despite some major progress”, this demand is 
considered to be, “as much a live issue as ever” (Bamberg 2003, 6). It has been estimated that 
among some 26,000 experts involved in standards committees of the official German 
standardization organization (DIN), a mere one tenth of a percent represent employees (ibid, 5). 
Without financial support by the German government, representation would be even weaker. 
While in northern European countries experts from trade unions actively participate in the 
technical work of the standards committees, their participation in southern European countries is 
“all but non-existent” (Schepel and Falke 2000, 123). 
Participation of environmental groups in standardization is “still in its infancy” – at the 
European as well as at the national level (ibid, p. 125). In 2000, the European Environmental 
Bureau (EEB), the Federation of Environmental Citizens Organizations, suspended its 
membership in the CEN’s Strategic Advisory Body on Environment (SABE) because SABE was 
“not equipped to have a real impact” on standardization.xx Moreover, the European Commission 
continued to reject a proposal by the EEB to fund direct involvement of environmental groups in 
the standardization process. But the newly founded European Environmental Citizens 
Organisations for Standardisation (ECOS) were awarded an EU contract, starting on November 
1, 2002, which facilitates the coordination of input of environmental organizations into standards 
work and representation of the members of ECOS at the EU institutions and European Standards 
Organizations. Assisted by the EEB, ECOS will send experts to technical committees and 
working groups.x The German DIN arranged for consideration of environmental aspects in the 
national standardization process through setting up a coordination office for environmental 
protection. This office, funded by the government, examines standards at the draft stage with 
respect to environmental issues. Furthermore, a contractual agreement with the government 
obliges the DIN “to work towards strengthening the weight of environmental concerns in 
European and international standardization” (Schepel and Falke, 2000, 126). 
The German corporatist tradition which is favorable to private interest- government 
arrangements has triggered far-reaching procedural provisions to involve in standardization 
consumer, employee and environmental groups (Voelzkow 1996). But even in this country a 
participation deficit of these groups could not be avoided (ibid, 230ff). 
Different formats have been chosen throughout Europe to facilitate participation of 
consumer, employee, and environmental groups in standardization.ii In some instances, group 
representatives have direct access to the committees in which the detailed standardization work 
is done. In other cases special committees have been set up in the SDOs to monitor the 
standardization work and to provide input into the working committee process if and when it 
appears necessary. Again in other cases, experts from consumer, employee or environmental 
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groups are members of the boards of standardization organizations where they have the 
opportunity to draw attention to the interests they represent but cannot feed them directly into the 
standardization work. Consumer groups and, to a greater degree, the other groups stress the lack 
of funds and other resources as being the main obstacle to effective participation in 
standardization (cf. Schepel and Falke 2000, 111-127). But, as has been argued concerning user 
participation in standardization, “the resource problem is actually a symbol of a number of more 
basic problems” (Hawkins 1995b, 28). These include the problem that single individuals who are 
delegated by a consumer, environmental or employee group into a standardization committee 
usually have a narrow focus of expertise which does not cover all aspects of a standard and in 
particular its cross references to other standards being developed in other committees. More 
serious is the issue of appropriate representation of the groups’ interests. Often it is difficult to 
establish that the view presented by the expert who represents a group is in fact the collective 
view (cf. ibid).  
No matter how they are initiated – either within the standards development organizations 
or by government encouragement or insistence – policies designed to widen the involvement of 
interests in the standardization process face fundamental problems. We have illustrated some of 
them. The voluntary nature of standardization, the openness of SDOs to all kinds of “interested” 
actors, the rules of due process and the consensus principle suggest that the institutional 
prerequisites exist to assure the adoption of good standards, i.e. technical standards which come 
close to the expectations and values of the actors involved. Official and informal SDOs share 
these prerequisites, but they cannot rule out the risk of indivdiual business firms controlling the 
standardization process at the international, the regional and to a minor degree also at the 
national level (Salter, 1999). Without public funding and other support, non-industry interests 
would not be represented in the standardization process at all. But direct involvement of experts 
from consumer, employees and environmental groups in the SDOs often fails to meet the 
expectations these groups associate with it. There is little evidence that their interests are often 
considered seriously in the standardization process. Thus, one can have doubts that “further 
efforts” to increase the participation of interested circles and to “pro-actively support 
participation of relevant stakeholders in standardisation work at the national, European, and 
international levels” will really have the effect intended by the European Commission.iii
Taken seriously, the stakeholder approach must also provide for the participation of civil 
liberties organizations and public interest groups in the standardization process. More than 
consumer, employee or environmental groups these organizations struggle for technical solutions 
which secure openness, help protect privacy and provide other elements of a democratic design 
of ICT systems. Adding public interests groups to the circle of actors actively involved in 
standardization, increases heterogeneity which is appreciated from a democratic design 
perspective but is problematic in terms of the efficiency and timeliness of standards adoption. 
‘Complexity overload’ at the working level of standards development will not only slow down 
the process but – given the consensus and due process principle – it often will result in an 
impasse or non-decision. In voluntary standardization “forum shopping”, i.e. switching from an 
overloaded SDO to one which is more exclusive or setting up a new private consortium with 
initial membership only from industry— would be one way out of this dilemma (Werle 2001a). 
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This option is available to big firms and “technology leaders” who may even chose to push their 
standards into the market without involving a standards committee (Austin and Milner 2001). 
Such bypass strategies apparently run counter the intention of providing the institutional 
conditions for the democratic design of technology. They reveal the limits of the stakeholder 
approach. 
Broadening the cognitive and normative frame of standard-setting 
If the legitimacy and democratic quality of standards adopted in SDOs is assessed using 
output rather than input criteria, then the aspect of direct participation of diverse interests in the 
standardization process loses significance. But it remains important to make sure that non-market 
interests and values be attracted and integrated into the process. Thus, as an alternative—or an 
addition— to launching a more active policy to involve non-market actors directly in the 
standardization process, attention should be paid to ancillary measures which help ensuring that 
non-market aspects are considered and awareness is directed to the democratic design of 
technology.  
For a long time, the cognitive frame of the standards developing process was a technical 
one. Standardization was perceived as a search process aiming at finding the technically optimal 
solution which then was easy to agree upon. The technical discourse prevailed and non-technical 
arguments tended to be considered illegitimate (Schmidt and Werle 1993). Since the 1970s, the 
technical discourse has increasingly been supplemented and sometimes marginalized by a 
business oriented commercial discourse.iiii Competitive concerns and profit interests are 
generally regarded as legitimate if not vital by the actors participating in standardization. 
Conflicting business interests are tamed only by the common interest in a standard and the 
resulting need to reach a consensus (Schmidt and Werle 1998). It must be seen on this backdrop 
that SDOs developed rules – often laid down in their bylaws – that addresses the role of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs), particularly patents and copyrights can play under what 
conditions in the standardization process (Iversen 2001). These rules have qualitatively changed 
during the past decade as the risks that the standardization process confronts essential IPRs have 
increased both in scope and in scale. (Iversen 1999). They aim at leveling the playing field, at 
preventing IPR holders from monopolizing the commercial benefits of a standard, but also at 
reiterating the public good nature of committee standards.  
The IPR example demonstrates that it is possible – in this case by changing the rules of 
the SDOs – to modify the cognitive and normative frame which guides the standardization 
process. While in this specific case the rules are intended to influence the commercial discourse, 
other instances show that they can also serve drawing attention to non-technical and non-
commercial issues. One example involves provisions which aim at integrating the specific needs 
of handicapped people in the standardization process. In many cases, ICT holds a unique promise 
for those with handicaps to gain access to services and, moreover, to important parts of the social 
life. Traditional design of ICT is not user-friendly in this respect and in effect excludes the social 
minority of the handicapped. Moreover, the group of the handicapped and their needs are very 
heterogeneous, because this category spans a wide range of individuals from those with impaired 
vision, to those with different types of other functional disabilities. Apart from practical 
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difficulties in some cases, this heterogeneity is an additional obstacle to involving them into 
standardization processes directly. 
Catering to the needs of the disabled is therefore one situation that calls for a more active 
public role. Public programs can help explore ways to enhance user-influence in the interest of 
improving the accessibility of the disabled to ICT. Public policies can also support relevant R&D 
and influence companies but also relevant international forums to integrate the needs of the 
disabled in the design of digital technology. Norway, to give an example, has launched the 
“Information Technology for the Disabled (IT Funk)” program as a long term attempt to 
influence the development of standards and new legislation at the European level in order to 
improve the conditions for the disabled in the Information Society, in terms of accessibility to 
ICT systems and services (see Diagram 2). 
 
Diagram 2: Information Technology for the Disabled (Norway) 
A 4-year R&D program (1998-2002) related to information technology for the disabled 
(IT FUNK), funded by the Norwegian Research Council, other government actors and 
industry. 
IT FUNK is charged with the following tasks: 
1) Support development and dissemination of universal design and other methodologies 
and instruments relevant for R&D, which make ICT products and services more 
accessible and useful for all, regardless of disability. 
2) Support R&D aimed at ICT-based solutions which are important for the ability of 
disabled people to participate fully in society. Financial support is given to projects 
based on universal design-principles and to projects on assistive technologies such as 
speech and language technologies. 
3) Challenge and support the ICT industry to improve the accessibility of their regular 
products and services, and develop solutions for persons with special needs. 
4) Require the use of standards and guidelines for accessibility to ICT-based products 




Several times the Norwegian program refers to the “design for all” principles. They are 
included in the “Guidelines for standard developers to address the needs of older persons and 
persons with disabilities” mandated by the EU and the EFTA and adopted by the official 
European SDOs in 2002.vvv The guidelines are intended to raise awareness of these issues and 
principles and to encourage standards committees to address them in their work. They also give 
instructions how to proceed when considering technical solutions and its alternatives. But they 
do not require the group whose needs are considered to be present in the standardization process. 
Recently ANEC published a long catalogue of “Consumer Requirements in 
Standardisation relating to the Information Society” meant as “a guidance document addressed to 
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standards-makers” (ANEC 2003, 3). Based on a comprehensive understanding of the consumers’ 
needs and with a main focus on the Internet, ANEC recommendations come close to some of the 
principles of democratic design outlined above. These guidelines, too, are meant to influence the 
cognitive and normative frame of standardization in SDOs (cf. Hawkins 1995b, 35ff). They 
usually do not require direct participation in committees but would not preclude it either. 
The Internet has stimulated a broad debate regarding the democratic quality of the 
standardization process focusing on IETF and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
(Froomkin 2003, Russell 2003). More than in other contexts of standardization, general aspects 
of the democratic design of the network rather than special consumer, employee or 
environmental interests are emphasized in this debate. But only a few public interests and civil 
society groups highlight the significance of standardization. Among them is the Center for 
Democracy and Technology (CDT) (http://www.cdt.org). This public-interest advocacy group 
has most actively promoted the democratic design goal in standardization. In 1996, the CDT 
convened the Internet Privacy Working Group which initiated the development of technical 
privacy specifications in the W3C. Some members of the working group were directly involved 
in the standardization work of the W3C. They participated in developing the Platform for 
Privacy Preferences (P3P) standard. This standardized technology communicates the privacy 
policies of web sites to the users that connect to them (Cranor 2002). 
The experience gathered in this activity— but also in several cases in the IETF— has 
been analyzed by members of the CDT’s Standards, Technology and Policy project (Davidson et 
al. 2002; Morris and Davidson 2003). They point to the limitations of direct participation of 
public interest advocates in standardization. Direct ongoing participation is regarded to be most 
effective, as in the case of P3P, but extremely time and resource intensive and, thus, not feasible 
as a standard operating procedure. But also the less resource-consuming ad hoc mode of 
participation is considered to be of limited usefulness because the public interest advocates 
remain in the role of an outsider whose suggestions can be easily dismissed by the committee. 
An alternative to direct participation is seen in monitoring and tracking the work of standards 
committees by the public interest community (Davidson, Morris and Courtney 2002). This 
requires the standardization process to be open and transparent.  
This latter strategy has been taken up by the project members. They developed a tool 
which they call “ritualized public policy impact assessments” in the Internet standards 
development process (Morris and Davidson 2003, 1). In 2003, the CDT submitted a draft 
document to the IETF which aims at creating awareness of potential policy impacts of the 
IETF’s design decisions.vv The document includes a list of more than 25 questions related to 
seven categories of public policy concern, ranging from “Content Censorship and Control” to 
“Personal Privacy.” They shall be addressed by the standard developers when they design new 
technologies. Although this formal public policy impact assessment process has not been 
implemented in the IETF it is characteristic of the efforts to broaden the cognitive and normative 
frame of standardization in order to promote the democratic design of ICT. 
 
  Conclusion and public policy implications 
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The significance of information and communication technology for a democratic society 
is not contentious. It has been underpinned by the expectations linked to the proliferation of the 
Internet. The network of networks is regarded to facilitate electronic democracy and online 
democracy. Like other technologies ICT does not automatically strengthen democracy. Its effects 
are partly contingent on the purposes for which the technology is used. But the effects are also 
shaped by the design and architecture of ICT. The design can be more or less compatible with 
the general principles of democratic governance which include openness, equality, access, 
transparency, and accountability. 
ICT systems which are decentralized and decomposable, open, transparent and easy to 
access and use, and which allow no usage control and protect privacy are more compatible with 
democracy than systems which lack all or some of these properties. In the process of ICT 
development these aspects are usually not systematically considered. Technical and economic 
factors have priority while compatibility with democratic principles is, if at all, of minor 
importance. Thus, whether or not a technology supports or impedes democracy can rarely be 
directly attributed to the interests and preferences that shape the design process. The democratic 
quality results rather from historical accident. The seminal example is the evolution of the 
Internet and of the TCP/IP protocols on which the network is based. No master plan existed 
which guided the development of the Internet. While the democratic dividend of the public 
domain nature of TCP/IP is undeniable, investments into this protocol have not been made with 
the intention to earn such a dividend. 
This does not mean that the architecture and function of technology cannot be designed in 
a way that supports or is at least compatible with democracy. But the opportunities for public 
policy to influence the design process are limited. Usually technical research and development 
takes places in company labs hidden from the public and from potential competitors. Companies 
which have invested into new technologies legitimately strive for a competitive advantage to 
recoup the investment and therefore are compelled to protect it from free-riders. The 
development of common technical standards is one of the rare occasions in which companies 
partly disclose their innovations. They do so voluntarily because they expect to benefit from the 
agreement of a common standard. Complex technologies are coordinated via standards. The 
coordination needs have increased considerably in the innovative area of ICT, and practically in 
parallel the number of standards committees in official SDOs as well as private consortia has 
grown. Standards determine the future development of an ICT system to a certain degree. If they 
are adopted in an early developmental stage they can have long lasting effects. The relative 
transparency of the committee process and the significance of standards for the structure and 
further development of ICT systems make standardization attractive for public policy 
intervention. 
The institutional structure of the majority of SDOs at the national, regional and 
international level shows a high degree of similarity. Formally, participation is open to all 
“substantially interested” actors. The working procedures follow due-process principles and are 
consensus-oriented. SDOs are non-profit organizations and their standards are non-mandatory 
and public goods. These features conform to the principles of democracy, but as such they do not 
guarantee the democratic legitimacy of the input into or the output of the standardization process. 
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Participation in standards development is time-consuming and resource-intensive. It is not 
remunerated by the SDOs. Developing standards also requires technical expertise. Taken 
together it is not surprising that the majority of participants in standardization are agents from 
firms or public research organizations. Given the plurality of interests and values in society these 
agents are definitely not representative. The bias towards industry interest representation is – 
with few exceptions – strongest at the international level, where even small and medium-sized 
enterprises are absent. 
Balancing interest and value representation through direct participation of all affected or 
interested groups appears to be illusionary. Apart from the considerably high costs, direct 
participation would likely result in complexity overload and deadlock in the committees. The 
overloaded SDOs would be bypassed and standardization would migrate into even more 
exclusive private consortia. Given the prevalence of technical and commercial argumentation in 
standardization only consumer representatives can be integrated in the standardization process 
relatively easily because they speak for the demand side of the market which cannot be ignored 
by firms. But even consumer representation has to rely on financial governmental support in 
most cases. 
Consequently, efforts to facilitate consideration and involvement of the plurality of 
interests and values, including basic principles of democracy, in standardization have shifted 
from the input to the output side of the process. These efforts – assisted and funded by 
governments – vary with regard to their specific starting-point. But they share the goal 
stimulating participants in standards developing processes to consider potential non-market and 
non-technical impacts of standards. They aim at broadening the cognitive and normative frame 
of the standardization discourse and creating awareness of a standard’s public policy 
implications. Direct participation of advocates of consumer, employee, environmental or more 
encompassing public interests can help directing awareness to issues which would have 
otherwise not been considered. But also issuing guidelines concerning the inclusion of non-
market interests and democratic principles in the standardization process can be helpful, 
especially if they are included in the bylaws of an SDO. In other instances the work of standards 
committees is monitored and “reviewed” by special committees from outside or by special 
boards within the SDOs and an assessment is returned to the standards committees. The 
committees are expected but usually not obliged to consider the evaluations and 
recommendations and modify the standards. All these measures aim at creating “good 
standards.” If adopted and implemented these standards would provide the basis for the 
emergence of ICT systems which are compatible with the principles of democracy. It would, 
however, mean overestimating the significance of standards would one infer that solely standards 
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